守法激励导向的道路交通安全违法行为记分制度研究
Research on the Point System for Road Traffic Violations with an Orientation toward Law-Abiding Incentives
DOI: 10.12677/ojls.2026.144124, PDF,    科研立项经费支持
作者: 周田昊然:公安部道路交通安全研究中心,北京
关键词: 交通违法累计记分制度激励博弈均衡法律实施Traffic Violations Cumulative Demerit Points Institutional Incentives Game Equilibrium Law Enforcement
摘要: “买分卖分”行为的猖獗,暴露出当前道路交通安全违法行为记分制度面临激励缺失与实施失效的危机。现有激励措施以“学法减分”为主,属于违法后补救手段,未能形成对长期守法的持续引导,导致驾驶人主动守法意愿不足。单纯强化惩罚存在边际效应递减、实施成本高、易引发规避行为等局限,因此需构建激励机制。为此,应当转向以“制度激励”为核心的治理逻辑,构建一个“正向引导”与“负面消除”相结合的激励体系,通过调整驾驶人在不同决策环节的成本–收益结构,引导交通参与者基于序贯理性做出选择,实现交通参与博弈中的稳定均衡,推动治理范式从被动惩戒向主动预防的转型。
Abstract: The current phenomenon of “buying and selling demerit points” has severely undermined the effectiveness of the traffic violation point system. This stems from the system’s over-reliance on post‑violation education and supervision, coupled with a lack of positive incentives for compliant behavior. Existing incentive measures, primarily the “point reduction through legal learning” mechanism, serve merely as remedial tools after violations occur. They fail to provide continuous guidance for long‑term compliance, leading to insufficient voluntary willingness among drivers to obey the law. Relying solely on stricter penalties suffers from limitations such as diminishing marginal effects, high enforcement costs, and a tendency to provoke evasion. Therefore, there is a need to establish a public‑authority‑led incentive mechanism. Accordingly, the governance logic should shift toward a focus on “institutional incentives”, constructing an incentive system that integrates “positive guidance” and “negative elimination”. By adjusting the cost-benefit structure for drivers at different decision‑making stages, this system aims to guide traffic participants in making choices based on sequential rationality, achieve a stable equilibrium in the traffic‑participation game, and advance the transformation of the governance paradigm from passive punishment to proactive prevention.
文章引用:周田昊然. 守法激励导向的道路交通安全违法行为记分制度研究 [J]. 法学, 2026, 14(4): 334-344. https://doi.org/10.12677/ojls.2026.144124

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