摘要:
本文提出了利用委托–代理模型和激励相容度的概念来判别一个监管政策的好坏的事前标准。基于这一标准，本文认为激励相容度越高则监管政策越有效。对我国监管政策有效性的事前判断的简化分析表明，在我国证券监管中，要制定一个有效的监管政策，首先要改变目前我国监管政策中对券商和投资者行为的不合理惩罚和激励制度，建立有助于促进券商和投资者选择有利于投资者的长远利益和市场的长远发展的行动，不断减少我国证券市场中的投机行为。为了更为全面地评价监管政策，本文不仅通过政策实施前后市场超额收益变化来判断，还通过对政策实施前后市场波动率的判断，主张降低股市波动率是我国监管政策的主要目标之一，并对政策实施前后的股市波动率进行了评价。
Abstract:
This paper puts forwards a beforehand criterion for judging the effectiveness of supervision in capital market, which makes use of agency by agreement model and concept of encouragement and consistent measurement. Based on this criterion, this paper holds that the higher the encouragement and consistent measurement, the more effective the supervisory policy. An analysis on beforehand criterion for judging has been made in this paper. This analysis shows that if we lay down an effective supervisory policy, we must reform the system of encouragements and penalties to the investment institutions, impel them to do something which benefits the investors and development of the market, and make speculation declined steadily in Chinese stock market. This paper not only makes an assessment by variation in super-profit, but also makes an overall assessment of the supervision policy in capital market through the estimation of fluctuating rate in the market around the exercising supervisory policy, and holds that we must reduce the ratio of fluctuation. This is a goal of the supervisory policy.