标题:
基于政府、企业和消费者博弈的电动汽车补贴政策建议Electric Vehicles Subsidy Policy Advises Based on Game between the Government, Enterprises and Consumers
作者:
马红, 张媛媛
关键字:
电动汽车补贴, 斯塔克伯格博弈分析, 节能减排效益Electric Vehicle Subsidies, Analysis of Stackelberg Models, Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Benefits
期刊名称:
《Service Science and Management》, Vol.4 No.4B, 2015-07-30
摘要:
我国电动汽车逐步进入产业化发展阶段，仍面临着产品价格过高，市场需求不足，尤其是消费者购买意愿不强等困境，导致电动汽车行业还无法迅速达成产业规模。因此，在电动汽车产业发展初期，需要相关政策手段予以支持，最常见的即是实施财政补贴。但是，目前电动汽车补贴政策存在着过补贴过低，补贴种类过于单一问题，严重影响补贴效率，进而影响政府对电动汽车行业的支持力度，乃至中国新能源汽车的发展战略。本文从博弈论角度，建立政府、汽车企业，和消费者的三阶段斯塔克博格博弈，得出政府对电动汽车补贴的最优额度。在此基础上，引入电动汽车节能减排公式，重点分析电动汽车节能减排效益，试图向政府提出制定电动汽车补贴政策的合理建议。
China’s electric vehicles has gradually
entered the industrialization stage of development, facing complex situations
and difficulties, such as high price and low demand, especially the weak consumer
purchase intention. All these have made that electric vehicle industry still
unable to reach the scale of the industry quickly. Thus, in the initial stage
of the development of electric vehicle industry, we need policy measures to
support it and the most common one is implementation of financial subsidies.
However, the present electric vehicle subsidies are too low and single, which
seriously affects the efficiency of policy, and even the development strategy
of China’s new energy vehicles. Based on the game theory, this paper has built
a three-stage Stackelberg model, which contains government, automobile
enterprises and consumers, and obtained the optimal amount of government
subsidies for electric vehicle. Then, it introduces the energy efficiency formula
for electric vehicles, trying to give reasonable advice to government on the
electric car subsidy policy.